Neorealism and International Subsystems of Small States: Insights from Sub-Saharan African Countries' Interactions by Muhindo, Mughanda & Calenzo, Gaetano
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 2, November 2011
©IdPS
148
ISSN 2039-8573 online
Neorealism and International Subsystems of Small States:
Insights from Sub-Saharan African Countries’ Interactions
MUGHANDA MUHINDO
Université Officielle de Ruwenzori
GAETANO CALENZO
University of Siena
Abstract
The prevailing wisdom in IR debates finds that neorealism is “the powerful tool” predicting weak states’ behaviour. It has 
been argued that systemic factors are more likely to explain foreign policy choices of small states if compared to domestic 
factors. This paper is an exploration of the structural realist hypotheses about small states’ behaviour in the international 
system. It particularly questions the importance given by neorealism to structural explanations while analysing small 
states’ behaviour, despite paying little attention to the relativity of smallness. However, the neo-realist hypotheses would 
become more consistent if tested on smaller states of subsystems crowded by countries considered small in global com-
parisons. By focusing on smaller states of the Sub-Saharan-African sub-system, this paper argues that neorealist expec-
tations find very little empirical support.
Introduction
The prevailing wisdom in IR debates finds that neore-
alism is “the powerful tool” predicting weak states’ be-
haviour. It has been argued that systemic factors are 
more likely to explain foreign policy choices of small 
states if compared to domestic factors (Wolfers 1962; 
Rosenau 1966; Jervis 1978; Waltz 1979; Walt 1987; Sny-
der 1991). This has been however a very partial way 
of looking at small states’ foreign policies because the 
relativity of weakness and smallness has not been duly 
taken into account. Attention has been paid to small 
states in periods when their positions had certain im-
plications for great powers. As such small states have 
been rarely studied. There was a vigorous theoretical 
debate in the late 1960s and 1970s about whether the 
foreign policy of ‘small states’ was generically different 
from that of large states (Keohane 1969). Two major 
events in that period were considered as big concerns 
for greater powers: the decolonization (and subse-
quent increase in number of legal international actors) 
and the oil crisis in which peripheral states were play-
ing a significant role. After a period of lesser attention, 
the interest in the role of smaller powers in interna-
tional politics has increased since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and an increasing securitization of the concept of 
small states (Hey 2003; Ingebritsen et al. 2006). Small 
states have been often located in the international 
system without considering what happens in interna-
tional subsystems crowded by weak states. The envi-
ronment-led image of small states’ foreign policy de-
serves further assessments in subsystems to provide 
a more comprehensive image of the phenomenon. 
This is the path this paper takes to investigate the root 
causes of sporadic and stable relationships between 
sub-Saharan African countries.
Weakness and smallness of states have been classi-
cally defined in terms of population, size (Vital 1967), 
national cohesion, military strength, geographic po-
sition, and monetary stability. More refined positions 
consider many other factors such as structural aid 
dependency, the leaders’ conviction that their states 
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cannot affect the international system and the low 
margin of security (Rothstein 1968: 29). Eek (1971: 11-
12) declared that “small states” is “a practical, conven-
tional term useful as such but evades definition” and 
this is attributable to the questions raised by their sta-
tus on the legal and political utility of statehood in the 
international system. Vukadinović (1971) explicated 
the link between small status, military and economic 
weakness, and an aspiration to democratize interna-
tional relations. Keohane’s (1988: 295-6) classification 
of states in the international system distinguishes 
between system-determining states, system affect-
ing states and system ineffectual states. Small states 
are those that cannot affect the international system. 
Their survival depends on the will of greater powers. 
This definition fits most African countries that are still 
aid-dependent (Bräutingam 2000) and none of which 
can influence individually the international system.
To test the appropriateness of neorealism in explaining 
intra-African relationships, this paper aims at exploring 
the root causes of activeness in three major sectors of 
states’ international life: diplomatic exchanges, bilat-
eral agreements, and membership in regional organi-
zations1. An empirical analysis of how African states 
shape their foreign policy choices in a regionalized 
context leads us to partially question the structural 
realist hypotheses about small state behaviour, while 
finding some support for alternative explanations.
Foreign policy 
of small states in IR debates 
Scholars largely agree that the international behaviour 
of small states can be accounted for by examining the 
effects of the international system. Since according to 
neorealism, weakness makes survival more difficult for 
1 For each country, we have been taken into account the 
total number of regional organizations it belongs to. The data 
have been collected from the United Nations program called 
Afrique Relance (http://www.un.org/french/ecosocdev/geninfo/
afrec/). Look also at the CIA Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/). Activeness concerning 
membership in regional organizations has been measured 
looking at each country’s share of the general regional number of 
frequencies of memberships in regional organizations:
where ARM is activeness concerning regional membership, CARM 
is the number of regional organizations a country belongs to, 
and SSARM is the total number of frequencies of membership in 
regional organizations.
small states than for great powers, their foreign policy 
can be better explained by taking the international 
system as the preferred level of analysis. “Since weak 
states are typically faced with external threats to na-
tional survival, foreign policy will reflect attentiveness 
to the constraints of the international environment 
and foreign-policy goals will be less constrained by 
the domestic political process” (Elman 1995: 175). This 
environment-led image of small states can be found in 
Waltz (1979) especially when he maintains that small 
states’ security and foreign policy will be dependent 
on structural constraints, such as the degree of great 
powers’ competition. These external constraints tend 
to be more restrictive for small states due to their “nar-
rower margin for error” (Waltz 1979: 184-5, 195). 
 Wolfer’s metaphor of the “burning house” fol-
lows the same reasoning, when he argues that even 
though all states are concerned with risks for their 
survival, not all of them are concerned to the same 
extent. Since behaviour of states according structural 
models is proportional to their proximity to complete 
compulsion, domestic variables are more relevant for 
the foreign policy of great powers, since they are less 
affected by environmental constraints (Wolfers 1962: 
13-16). Compared to them, small states are more ex-
posed to the influence of systemic factors, and Ro-
senau (1966: 47-48) finds that small states are also 
those that, most of the time, adopt acquiescent poli-
cies.
Thinking of foreign policy as an adaptive form of be-
haviour, Rosenau (1970a and 1970b) introduced the 
concept of adaptation into the lexicon of foreign pol-
icy analysis. He identified four possible types of adap-
tive foreign policy behaviour, depending on how for-
eign affairs officials typically respond to demands and 
changes coming from the international and domestic 
environment: 1) acquiescent, where external demands 
and changes are mainly responded to; 2) intransigent, 
where domestic demands and changes are mainly re-
sponded to; 3) promotive, wherein most changes and 
demands from both environments may be ignored 
because they cancel each other out, because they are 
weak, or because of the effective political isolation of 
the decisions makers; 4) preservative, where demands 
and changes from both environments are responded 
to in making foreign policy. The typical aims of policy 
toward each environment are defined accordingly: 1) 
acquiescent policies aim to modify domestic struc-
tures to agree with external demands; 2) intransigent 
policies seek to change the international environ-
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ment to agree with domestic structure; 3) promotive 
policies aim at a new equilibrium between domestic 
and international demands by changing both envi-
ronments; 4) preservative policies, which are classical 
status quo policies, seek to maintain given external 
balance by aiming at no international and domestic 
change (McGowan and Gottwald 1975: 474). Conse-
quently, their foreign policy can be better accounted 
for by looking at the international environment.
In addition, small states are particularly affected by the 
security dilemma, because the cost of being cheated 
is much less tolerable to them and no “safety net” can 
guarantee against the consequences of foreign-policy 
mistakes. “Defensible borders, large size, and protec-
tion against sudden attack not only aid the state, but 
facilitate cooperation that can benefit all states”, mak-
ing more states more vulnerable to anarchy than big 
states (Jervis 1978: 172-3). Thus, due to their extreme 
vulnerability, they are supposed to prefer an alliance 
with a dominant power rather than risking an immedi-
ate attack (Walt 1987: 21-31).
 Over the years, scholarly agreement on small 
state behaviour has even grown(Snyder 1991: 20; Nin-
cic 1992: 16). While in great powers “domestic pressures 
often outweigh international ones” (Snyder 1991: 62), 
“system-oriented” (Labs 1992: 385-6) small states’ are 
more responsive to demands from the external envi-
ronment, making systemic explanations more prob-
able (Snyder 1991: 317-18). Thus, “structural realism is 
inadequate to explain the behaviour of states in the 
core but is relevant for understanding regional secu-
rity systems in the periphery” (Goldgeier and McFaul 
1992: 475-6). 
 Considering states in the international sys-
tem as animals in the jungle, Schweller  argues that 
the “balance of interests” accounts not only for “li-
ons” (states that are kings of the international jungle) 
and “lambs” (the weak prey, safe for the time being) 
whose interests lie in maintaining the status quo. He 
also mentions “jackals” (states that bandwagon to eat 
the crumbs of other parties) and most importantly, 
“wolves” (states powerful enough to be dissatisfied 
with the status quo and to do something about it). He 
concludes observing that rather than being suscepti-
ble to domestic level influences, weak states’ (lambs) 
foreign policy and military behaviours depend on “ex-
treme systemic constraints” (Schweller 1992: 267).
 Scarce discordant voices (David 1991; Ayoob 
1991; Hey’s 2003) against the prevailing literature on 
small states foreign policy argue that “questions of le-
gitimacy, authority, and national identification remain 
unsettled” (Rothstein 1977: 35). Taking into considera-
tion three levels of analysis—individual, national and 
international—the aspects of leadership (Mora 2003; 
Sanchez 2003; Braveboy-Wagner 2008) the position 
of a country in the sub-regional system (Mora 2003), 
and quality of bureaucracy (Braveboy-Wagner 2008) 
are crucial in defining a small state’s position in the 
international system. 
 These contributions suggest that constructiv-
ism, the internal structure approach, and geopolitics 
should be dully taken into account when looking at 
the root causes of the behaviour of small states. In-
stead of looking for rational explanations of states’ 
behaviour, constructivists consider that choices can 
be made following the logic of appropriateness. They 
maintain that international choices of countries are 
also based on the link between interest and identity 
(Wendt 1992; Ruggie 1998).  On the other hand, the 
internal structure approach considers internal struc-
ture of countries as good explanations of their behav-
iour. The regime, the quality of bureaucracy, and the 
quality of state-society nexus affect countries’ choices 
on the international scene (Katzenstein 1976; Risse-
Kappen 1991, Evangelista 1988). Geopolitics instead 
gives more weight to factors linked to geographical 
position and to physical opportunities of countries 
(Spykman 1944; Jean 2008).
Structural realism 
and African countries?
However, both neorealism and the mentioned dis-
cordant authors have studied small states in broader 
contexts, without exploring the relativity of smallness 
and weakness. For instance, if the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DRC) can be regarded as small 
in comparison to the United States of America and is 
expected to behave according to its relative weight in 
the international system, the results of the DRC’s be-
haviour out of big states context is yet to be explored. 
If neo-realists are right, their explanation should in-
clude “smaller” states’ behaviours in subsystems. What 
happens if the relationships between small states are 
separated from the big states (relativizing the concept 
of smallness)? Applied to African countries, this ques-
tion can be reformulated as follows: how powerful is 
the neo-realist theory in accounting for intra-African 
interactions? 
Such a question is worth facing in such settings as 
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the African ones, where neorealism seems not to ac-
count properly for small states’ behaviours. Empirical 
support to neorealism can be found when referring to 
the leading role played by Zaire in the African Great-
Lake region thanks to its connections (foreign aid and 
military support) with extra-African relevant powers 
during the Cold War. Being the most active in the re-
gion (Young and Turner 1985; Bustin 1987; Wamba dia 
Wamba 2007), Zaire took initiatives in building region-
al organizations  and opened embassies in all neigh-
bouring countries. The leading role of Zaire together 
with the levels of its activeness changed with the end 
of the Cold War, providing more space to Uganda and 
Rwanda. The leading roles and the primacy in active-
ness of these two countries have been linked to their 
better connections with extra-African powers (Cross 
and Misser 2006; Braeckman 1999; Williame 1991). 
Neo-realists will be right as long as these countries 
are considered as located in the global system. For in-
stance, most of the countries regarded as wolves or li-
ons did not participate in the recent war in the DRC. In 
the Congolese case, could one argue that Zimbabwe 
Figure 1. Intra-African diplomatic exchanges
Figure 2. Intra-African registered bilateral agreement 
(South Africa = 87, excluded for readability reasons)
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was a lion, Uganda and Rwanda were the wolves, small 
rebel groups were the jackals or lambs, and the DRC 
was the big lamb seeking not to be ripped in pieces? 
This is not clear for traditional structural realists.
Structural realism would find it hard to account for 
the appointment of Chief mediators in African con-
flicts where age, personality and political position play 
a role in the choice of peacemakers. From a purely 
neorealist point of view, negotiators could have been 
chosen among personalities from internationally in-
fluential countries. This has not been necessarily true 
for African countries as cases of Guinea-Conakry, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Liberia show. Here, as well as in other ex-
amples provided by recent African history2, it makes 
sense to ask the question of to what extent structural 
realism’s predictions fit African cases.
An analysis of three major sectors of states’ interna-
tional life—diplomatic exchanges3, bilateral agree-
ments, and membership in regional organizations—
tests the appropriateness of neorealism in explaining 
intra-African relationships. Diplomatic exchanges rep-
2 Realism might also fail to explain African leaders’ support 
to Robert Mugabe, heavily pressed by Western powers. At the 
second Euro-African summit in 2003, the UK strongly opposed the 
presence of Mugabe (Jeune Afrique, August 2000). The summit 
was postponed sine die because African leaders refused to attend 
without Mugabe. None of them still feared sanctions. Even if most 
of them recognized the worrying situation of Zimbabwe, through 
their support for Mugabe they meant to resist Western pressures. 
Mugabe was a kind of symbol of such a resistance to neo-colonial 
practices (Le Monde diplomatique, October 2001).
3 For each country, the number of other African states 
with which an exchange of diplomatic representations exists (at 
least one side being represented in the other side), regardless 
for their level (chargé d’affaires, minister, or ambassador). The 
data, referring to 2005, have been processed from the Correlates 
of War Diplomatic Exchange Data Set (Bayer 2006). Activeness 
in diplomatic exchanges has been measured looking at each 
country’s share of the general regional number of registered 
(considered) diplomatic exchanges:  
 
where ADE is the activeness in diplomatic exchanges, CDE is the 
number of diplomatic exchanges of the country, and SSADE is 
the total number of frequencies of diplomatic exchanges of SSA 
countries considered as a whole. Every single country’s Activeness 
in diplomatic exchange has been operationalized dividing the 
total number of its diplomatic exchange by the number of the 
total exchanges registered in the subsystem. This result had to 
be divided by 2 in order to avoid repetitions because every single 
observation has been registered twice (diplomatic exchanges 
concerns two countries). However, the related graph (as well as 
those relating to bilateral agreements and regional membership) 
reports absolute numbers in order to facilitate the reader’s 
comprehension.
resent stable bilateral relationships while bilateral 
agreements represent sporadic ones. Regional mem-
bership speaks instead of engagement in multilateral 
relations. Considering these three aspects of interstate 
relations allows being comprehensive because the 
main dimensions of the nature of states’ interactions 
have been considered. The specific question this re-
search is concerned with is therefore about what ex-
plains the variability among SSA states on these three 
aspects of interstate relations.
Looking at the above mentioned domain of states’ in-
teractions an image of African interactions emerges 
that might challenge the neo-realist explanations. 
From a purely neo-realist point of view, greater active-
ness in international relations should be registered 
among small states seeking survival in a dangerous 
environment. However, the activeness in diplomatic 
exchanges2 of SSA countries (figure 1) shows that the 
only states having more than 20 diplomatic partners 
are Ethiopia (37 missions), Nigeria (34 missions), South 
Africa (32 missions) and the DRC (22 missions). These 
four states have been usually regarded as the refer-
ence countries of their respective geographic areas: 
Eastern, Western, Southern and Central Africa. At the 
other side of the graph, those with the lowest level 
of diplomatic exchange are small island-states (Sey-
chelles, Comoros, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe 
and Mauritius) and two small states on the dry land 
(Lesotho and Guinea-Bissau).
The picture is mixed (figure 2) for the activeness in bilat-
eral agreements4.
Higher activeness is registered among “weaker” and in-
4 For each country, the total number of bilateral agreements 
stipulated with other African states since independence and 
registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. The data 
have been collected from the United Nations Treaty Collection 
(UNTC) and are updated to January 2010. Activeness in bilateral 
agreements has been measured looking at each country’s share of 
the general regional number of frequencies of bilateral agreements 
performing the following calculus:
 
where ABA is activeness in bilateral agreements, CBA is the country’s 
number of bilateral agreements, and SSABA is the total number of 
registered bilateral agreements in the SSA. Every single country’s 
Activeness in bilateral agreements has been operationalized 
dividing the total number of its registered agreements by the 
number of the total bilateral agreements of countries of the 
subsystem. This result had to be divided by 2 in order to avoid 
repetitions because every single observation has been registered 
twice (bilateral agreements concern two countries).
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secure states as well as in “stronger” and more secure 
ones. The most striking observation here is the excep-
tional position of South Africa as an outlier, with its 87 
agreements: it has agreements with virtually all other 
African states. It is however followed by Liberia and Si-
erra Leone: 19 agreements (all between the two states). 
Senegal follows with 13 agreements, while Nigeria, 
Gambia and the DRC have ten and Mali and Namibia 
have nine each. At the other end of the continuum are 
the Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Madagascar, 
and Togo with no agreements, and another group with 
only one agreement (Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, Maurita-
nia, Central African Republic, São Tomé and Príncipe, So-
malia and Zambia). The average number of agreements 
is about six, but the median value is 3: 24 countries out 
of a population of 48 are located at or below this value. 
This picture of African bilateral agreements suggests 
that “normally” smaller states engage less in bilateral 
agreements than bigger ones especially when they are 
not directly threatened by the environment (cases of 
war: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC). This partially 
indicates the validity of structural realism for the SSA re-
gion. However, it remains hard to explain higher levels 
of activeness of relatively peaceful and strong states like 
South Africa, Mali, and Namibia.
The activeness in regional organizations,4 shows that 
the number of organizations, in which states participate, 
ranges from two (Mauritania) to seven (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Togo). In addition African 
States can be split in five groups (figure 3): a group of 
five countries register the highest number of regional 
organizations they belong to (seven); the following 
level is composed by seven states being members of 
six regional organizations. Up to the second group, it 
Figure 1. Intra-African diplomatic exchanges
seems that smaller states are more active when consid-
ering regional membership.
However, from the third group onwards this picture 
changes radically because countries registering mem-
bership in only four regional organizations are also 
those that are better off politically and economically 
(Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles etc.). In 
the very last group with states registering membership 
in only three regional organizations, some of them are 
relatively strong states in the sub-system (Ghana, Nige-
ria), others are very weak or failing (Sudan, Somalia). The 
question of the reliability of neo-realists hypotheses, 
thus, becomes more appropriate. Theory and methods 
a) Theory
The structural realist hypotheses generally suggest 
expecting higher levels of each dimension of power 
(economic, military, or political) to correspond with 
lower engagement in interstate relations for the 
weaker sensitivity to the environment. Weaker sub-
jects will engage more for their survival. From a pure 
neo-realist point of view, African smaller states eco-
nomic, political, and military weakness will determine 
their behaviours. Conversely, better outcomes in eco-
nomic, military and political sectors will negatively in-
fluence the international activeness of states. This rea-
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soning can be represented by the following function:
where Y is activeness in intra-African relations;
βs represent the average decrease the dependent variable; 
e is economic power (Human Development);
m military power (Composite Index of National Capabilities);
p is political power (Failed States Index).
The above displayed explanation does not apply the same 
way to the different aspects of states interactions. Indeed, as 
far as neorealism can account for all of them, their different 
nature suggests thinking about more specific explanations. 
In this article, the equation representing the neo-realist hy-
potheses can generally be used for bilateral agreements 
and diplomatic exchanges because they have been consid-
ered as general numbers without linking them to any par-
ticular policy area. What can make the difference between 
them are the contingency of the first and the stability of the 
second ones.
To be considered differently is membership in regional or-
ganizations. Most African regional organizations have been 
founded with the aim of strengthening local economies 
and united handling of peace matters (Nkrumah 1964; Diop 
1987; Amoako 2002). Furthermore, the same organizations 
have been commonly conceived as places where autocrats 
meet to get support from other autocrats (Sylla 2003). Final-
ly, African regional organizations have been commonly pre-
sented as initiatives of countries assuming regional leader-
ship (Decraene 1964: 84; Bach and Vallée 1990). The first idea 
of African regionalism leads to unchanged general expla-
nations assigned to activeness by structural realism: smaller 
African countries will join regional organizations due to their 
weaker economic and political conditions. However, when 
other characteristics show that in a pure neo-realist per-
spective, the explanations to be taken into account are not 
generic aspects of power but very specific ones. If some join 
to get support from other autocrats, internal elite factionali-
zation can be considered as a proxy measure of the weak-
ness that leads governments to join regional organizations. 
If regional organizations are initiatives of stronger countries, 
the proximity to such countries speaks of the vulnerability 
in the environment that should lead smaller countries to 
bandwagon.
b) Methods
  Since this article aims to assess the validity of 
neo-realist provisions on smaller states of subsystems, 
it compares neo-realist hypothesis to alternative ex-
planations provided by its critics. It takes into consid-
eration the contributions from three other theoretical 
families explaining state behaviour: constructivism, in-
ternal structure approach, and geopolitics. These the-
ories suggest intervening variables previously over-
looked by neo-realists. Social constructivists advise 
looking not only at rational choices but also at choices 
made following the logic of appropriateness because 
international choices of countries are also based on 
the link between interest and identity (Wendt 1992; 
Ruggie 1998). The internal structure approach consid-
ers that a country’s behaviour and interests are me-
diated by its internal structure—regime, bureaucracy, 
and the state-society nexus (Katzenstein 1976; Risse-
Kappen 1991; Evangelista 1988). Geopolitics suggests 
looking at geographical position; and physical oppor-
tunities of a single country (Spykman 1944; Jean 2008) 
as intervening variables.
Criticizing neo-realist propositions, constructivists 
multiply the number of hypotheses to be checked for 
they regard a country’s self-perception as an interven-
ing variable between capabilities and activeness. As a 
result, mediated by self-perception and the propen-
sity to act coherently with the self-assigned status, 
capabilities will lead to high or low activeness. This 
reasoning leads to the following transformation of the 
neo-realist function:
where Y is activeness in intra-African relations;
βs represent the average increase or decrease of the 
dependent variable;
ODA is the Official Development Assistance5;
rL is regional leadership6
The internal structure approach maintains that regime, 
the quality of bureaucracy and the nature of the state–
society nexus are intervening variables between realist 
5 Official Development Assistance leads countries to 
perceive themselves as being better connected and more 
important in a context crowded by aid-dependent countries 
(Brautingam). Indeed African countries that have assumed regional 
leadership are also those who have received more ODA (r > 0.6).
6 Regional leadership has been measured assigning 1 
to those countries that have assumed or have been assuming a 
leading position in political, economic or military terms. For the 
southern African region we assigned 1 to South Africa. In the Great 
lake region we assigned 1 to the DRC (during the cold war) and 
Uganda. In Central Africa, this mark has been assigned to Nigeria 
for obvious reasons. In Western Africa countries such as Burkina 
Faso (for the role Blaise Compaoré has been playing in the region), 
Côte d’Ivoire (when Houphouet Boigny was president), Senegal 
(during Senghor and to a certain extent up to know with Wade) 
have been assigned the 1. In the Horn of Africa a leading role is 
generally recognized to Ethiopia. All the other countries have been 
assigned 0.
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variables and state behaviour outcomes. Thus, coun-
tries’ capabilities will influence their activeness to the 
extent that they are influenced by the nature of the in-
ternal structure of countries. If the internal structure ob-
servations are reliable, the neo-realist functions should 
be transformed as follows: 
Here Y is once again activeness in intra-African relations;
βs represent the average increase or decrease of the 
dependent variable;
FH (Freedom House) measures the levels of political 
and civil liberties;
GINI (Gini index) measures the levels of income inequal-
ity7.
Scholars of geopolitics will suggest looking also at the 
geographical position of countries as a determinant 
of the variability of intra-African levels of interaction of 
SSA countries. A landlocked country is likely to behave 
differently from a country with maritime frontiers. The 
geographic position of a country will have either inde-
pendent effects or act as an intervening variable. In the 
latter case, the neo-realist function will be modified as 
follows:
Here Y is once again activeness in intra-African relations;
βs represent the average increase or decrease of the 
dependent variable;
LL represents the fact that a country is landlocked or 
not;
LN is the total number of land neighbors;
MF is the total number of maritime neighbors.
In all considered forms of international activeness in 
subsystems where all considered countries are different 
from one another, the most appropriate design is the 
MDSD. Since all considered dependent variables have 
been built as interval variables, the estimation of the ef-
fects of each group of variables that are suggested by 
the various theoretical families of the IR debates will be 
estimated through a linear regression analysis. Analysis 
will be performed separately for each aspect of the de-
pendent variable. Diverse models will be run in order to 
7 The Freedom House ratings speak of society and states 
are connected from a political point of view. The GINI index 
measuring income inequality accounts to a certain extent to the 
connection between society and economic elites (those having 
more economic means).
make comparisons between competing explanations of 
SSA countries’ behaviours in their sub-system.
The choice of the studied region is linked to the fact that 
the neo-realist hypothesis does not to fit the cases of 
smaller SSA countries in the African sub-system. In addi-
tion, the SSA countries represent a consistent number of 
nation-states, thus contributing to generalization.   
The explanatory neo-realist variables to be considered 
relate to state capacity (economic, military and political). 
Military capacity is assessed though the Composite In-
dex of National Capability8, economic capacity  through 
the Human Development Index, and political power 
through the Failed States Index9.When examining the 
determinants of membership in regional organizations, 
variables concerning proximity to a leading country and 
factionalized elites are introduced. Variables suggested 
by other aforementioned theoretical families are consid-
ered as control ones.
Empirical assessments 
Determinants of activeness in bilateral agreements
The examination of determinants of activeness in bilateral 
agreements in Africa, shows little support to the neo-realist 
explanations. The results of the OLS analysis (Table 1) sug-
gest that the higher levels of state failure determine lower 
activeness in bilateral agreements. On the other hand, higher 
state capacity leads to higher levels of activeness in bilateral 
agreements. Most interestingly, putting into the model only 
variables suggested by the neo-realist prospective, they ac-
count for circa 50% of the variability of activeness in bilateral 
agreements (adjusted R square = 0.49). In addition, introduc-
ing variables from other theoretical families, the neorealist 
variables lose neither in strength nor in significance. Instead 
their strength increases as to give support to those theoretical 
families adding intervening variables to the pure neo-realist 
model. The introduction of constructivist variables generates 
an increase of the coefficient of the Failed States Index and 
the Composite Index of National Capability respectively from 
-0.37 to -0.47 and from 0.64 to 1.09. Furthermore, the total vari-
ance explained by the model also increases from 49% to 53%. 
8 This is a composite measure of national power devised 
by David J. Singer for the Correlates of War project in 1963 (Singer, 
Bremer and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987). The most recent available 
data refer to 2001. The index consists in a mean of each country’s 
ratio (as a percentage of the world’s total) of six components: total 
population, urban population, iron and steel production, primary 
energy consumption, military expenditure, and military personnel.
9 The Failed States Index built by the Fund for Peace 
(www.fundforpeace.org) assesses the stability and political risk 
of countries by focusing on key economic, social, and political 
indicators, including, as applicable, their relations with other 
countries in the region and local issues.
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The same observation is enforced when introducing varia-
bles that are suggested by internal structure theorists and stu-
dents of geopolitics. The latter deserve a particular mention 
since they enhance the explanation of variance. Introducing 
geopolitical variables, they add 10% to the explained variance 
obtained in previous estimations. 
These descriptions do not fit into the results of the OLS analy-
sis. The variables taken from other theoretical families do not 
register significant effects. However, this is due to the fact 
that they are intervening variables. Their effects have been 
reversed in significant neo-realist explanations. This is what is 
shown by an OLS analysis taking into account the composite 
state capacity as a dependent variable and all the variables 
suggested by constructivism, internal structure approach, 
and geopolitics (Table 2). In fact, they account for 76% of the 
variance (R square = 0.76) of state capacity in African coun-
tries. In addition, at least one variable per theoretical family 
registers significant effects (marked by asterisks). This analysis 
Table 1. Activeness in bilateral agreements in SSA countries, a multiple OLS Analysis (N=48)
Table 2. State capacity in SSA countries, a multiple OLS analysis
Table 1. Activeness in bilateral agreements in SSA countries, a multiple OLS Analysis 
(N=48)
Standardized beta coefficients
Predictors Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Failed States Index -0.37(*) -0.47(*) -0.43(*) -0.46(*)
Composite Index of National 
Capability 0.64(**) 1.09(**) 1.07(**) 1.14(**)
Human Development -0.02 -0.12 -0.19 -0.19
Average ODA 1960-2008 -0.30 -0.28 0.02
Regional leadership (dummy) 0.10 0.11 0.08
Activeness in diplomatic exchanges -0.32 -0.31 -0.57(*)
Freedom House average score 
1990-1999 -0.07 -0.16
Gini index 1992-2007 0.12 0.10
Landlocked (dummy) -0.37
No. of land border neighbors 0.57
No. of maritime boundary neighbors -0.21
Total no. of unique neighbors -0.63
R Square 0.53 0.60 0.61 0.75
Adjusted R Square 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.64 
(**) p < 0.01
(*)  p < 0.05
Table 2. State capacity in SSA countries, a multiple OLS analysis
Standardized beta coefficients
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Average ODA 1960-2008 1.832(*) 1.867(*) 2.641(**)
Regional leadership (dummy) -0.487 -0.451 -0.738
Activeness in diplomatic exchanges 5.321(**) 5.146(**) 5.391(**)
Activeness in regional membership -0.267 -0.036 0.849
Gini index 1992-2007 -1.027 0.745 1.056
Freedom House average score 1973-2009 0.15 0.933
Landlocked (dummy) -1.163
No. of land border neighbors -2.354(**)
No. of maritime boundary neighbors -1.864(*)
Total no. of unique neighbors 1.307
R Square 0.761 0.766 0.823
Adjusted R Square 0.735 0.724 0.764 
(**) p < 0.05
(*)  p < 0.1
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provides support to constructivism and geopolitics. Engage-
ment in bilateral agreements seems to be linked to country’s 
strength, which is such for the role it plays and the geographi-
cal position it occupies in the sub-system. If internal structure 
variables do not serve as bridges between state capacity and 
activeness in bilateral agreements, they do work as bridges 
between state failure and bilateral agreements. An OLS with state 
failure as a dependent variable and the independent variables of 
constructivism, internal structure, and geopolitics support this 
claim (Table 3). Indeed, internal structure variables alone account 
for more than 45% of the variance in levels of state failure. Deter-
minants of activeness in diplomatic exchanges
Standardized beta coefficients
Predictors Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  
Average ODA 1960-2008 -1.01 -0.91 -0.23
Regional leadership (dummy) 1.36 1.67 1.12
Activeness in diplomatic exchanges 0.24 -0.33 0.11
Activeness in regional membership 0.62 0.04 -0.12
Gini index 1992-2007 1.91 0.54 0.40
Freedom House average score 1973-2009 5.30 (**) 5.13 (**)
Landlocked (dummy) -1.43
No. of land border neighbors -1.73 (*)
No. of maritime boundary neighbors -2.24 (**)
Total no. of unique neighbors 1.55
R Square 0.07 0.53 0.63
Adjusted R Square -0.03 0.45  0.50  
(**) p < 0.05
(*)  p < 0.1
Table 3. State failure in SSA countries, a multiple OLS analysis
Structural realist expectations do not hold true when analysing the 
determinants of activeness in diplomatic exchanges. The results of a 
multiple OLS analysis (Table 4) witness that the greater the capacity of 
a state, the greater its activeness in diplomatic exchanges. The Com-
posite Index of National Capability alone accounts for about 72% of 
the variance of activeness in diplomatic exchanges in SSA countries.
Once again, even if variables of constructivism and internal struc-
ture may seemingly augment the level of explained variance 
once introduced in the model, they are not significant. However, 
this is due to the presence of other intervening variables.
Standardized beta coefficients
Predictors Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Failed States Index 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 0.06
Composite Index of National 
Capability 0.86 (**) 0.79 (**) 0.79 (**) 0.87 (**)
Human Development -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.07
Average ODA 1960-2008 0.13 0.12 0.11
Regional Leadership (dummy) 0.16 0.16 0.09
Activeness in bilateral agreements -0.16 -0.16 -0.28 (*)
Freedom House average score 1990-
1999 -0.01 -0.17
Gini index 1992-2007 0.00 0.00
Landlocked (dummy) 0.22
No. of land border neighbors 1.11 (**)
No. of maritime boundary neighbors 0.68 (*)
Total no. of unique neighbors -1.00 (**)
R Square 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.88
Adjusted R Square 0.72  0.76  0.74  0.82  
(**) p < 0.01
(*) p < 0.05
Table 4. Activeness in diplomatic exchanges in SSA, a multiple OLS analysis (N=48)
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Such an observation applies only to constructivism for two rea-
sons. First, internal structure variables, which should bridge the ef-
fects of state failure without a significant effect on the dependent 
variable, cannot be taken into account. Second, variables taken 
from geopolitics register direct effects on the dependent vari-
able. Indeed, a high number of land neighbours is positively af-
fected by the level of activeness. This is “good neighbour policy”10.
As far as smaller states engage less in diplomatic exchanges, the 
neo-realist prediction has not found any support. The same can 
be stated for the internal structure approach. Instead, sugges-
tions from constructivism and geopolitics should be taken into 
account, when determining root causes of SSA countries’ levels 
of activeness in diplomatic exchanges are the.
Determinants of membership in regional organizations
If neorealism has failed in explaining sporadic and stable bilateral 
relationships of African countries, it seems to apply to the active-
ness of countries for what concerns membership in regional 
organizations. When considering only neo-realist-oriented vari-
10 The “Good Neighbour Policy” was the foreign policy of 
the administration of United States President Franklin Roosevelt 
toward the countries of Latin America. The United States wished to 
have good relations with its neighbors, especially at a time when 
conflicts were beginning to rise once again, and this policy was 
more or less intended to garner Latin American support.
ables, the proximity to a leading regional power has positive and 
significant effects on the activeness in regional membership. 
These effects are multiplied when adding explanations from the 
constructivist approach. 
The neo-realist approach fits African realities until we introduce 
explanations from the internal structure approach which will 
prove to be the leading explanation of states’ involvement in re-
gional organizations. In fact, the introduction of such variables as 
political and civil liberties leads to a decrease of the effect of prox-
imity to leading actors (β changes from 2.33 to 1.67). In addition 
the significance of its effects disappears. On the other hand, the 
geopolitical variables do not register direct significant effects be-
cause they are intervening variables between internal structure 
variables and country activeness in regional organizations. 
Adding variables from the internal structure approach to the 
analysis makes some of the variables that neorealism could have 
taken into account change their sign and significance. This is the 
case with the variable of levels of economic decline that registers 
in the last model significant and negative effects on the depend-
ent variable. This means that weaker and smaller states (those 
that are experiencing economic decline) are less likely to engage 
in regional organizations. Finally, considering only the internal 
structure explanations, we understand that those presenting 
Table 5. Membership in regional organizations in SSA Countries, a multiple OLS 
analysis (N=48)
Standardized beta coefficients
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Closeness to regional leader country 1.87(*) 2.33(**) 1.67 0.44
2008 Factionalized Elites 1.09 0.88 0.30 0.11
2009 Economic Decline -0.34 -0.52 -0.65 -1.77(*)
Regional leadership (dummy) 1.92(*) 1.03 1.22 0.66
Activeness in diplomatic exchanges -0.80 -1.12 -1.52
Activeness in bilateral agreements -0.11 0.10 -0.89
Average ODA 1960-2008 0.91 0.89 1.68
Freedom House average score 
1973-2009 1.86(*) 2.15(**)
Gini index 1992-2007 1.39 1.76(*)
Landlocked (dummy) -0.89
No. of land border neighbors -0.20
No. of maritime boundary neighbors -1.40
Total no. of unique neighbors -0.05
R Square 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.46
Adjusted R Square 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.20 
(**) p < 0.05
(*)  p < 0.1
Table 5. Membership in regional organizations in SSA Countries, a multiple OLS analysis (N=48)
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